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The Greek Crisis, A Lesson for Poland 
CASIMIR DADAK 
Hollins University, Roanoke, United States 
reece is experiencing an unprecedented decline in the level of economic activity 
and standard of living. Over the period of2008-12 the nation's real GDP lost 
a total of over 20 percent and the most recent projections show that the reces-
sion will continue for another year and that the nation will lose yet another 4.2 percent!. 
This is an economic catastrophe that has no parallel in the Western worl~ during peace-
time. Greece is not the only nation in the euro area that is experiencing severe economic 
problems. As of May 2013 four other euro area countries, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and 
Cyprus, required financial aid from other members of the region and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). The current crisis started in the United States, but it has affected 
the euro area to a much greater extent. In fact, America managed to overcome this ca-
lamity already in late 2009 while the euro area still suffers from its aftershocks. 
The diverging post-crisis paths in the United States and the euro area point to fatal 
wealmesses of the European economic order. The roots of the economic malaise were 
sown in 1992 when the Continent chose to adopt a single currency. Economists as 
diverse as James Tobin and Milton Friedman predicted that the euro may cause severe 
economic difficulties2• Those pessimistic predictions originate in the fact that the euro 
area is not an optimum currency area3. Unfortunately, the document that served as the 
justification for the implementation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
dismissed optimum currency theory as "limited and outdated" and proclaimed that the 
analysis of EMU feasibility should not be confined to "this rather narrow approach"4. 
1 Eurostat, European Commission, accessed May 20,2013, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/ 
portal/statisticslsearch_database. Accessed on May 20, 2013. 
2 James Tobin, "Monetary Policy: Recent Theory and Practice," in Current Issues in Monetary Economics ed. 
Helmut Wagner (Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag, 1995), 13-21; Milton Friedman in The wall Street Journal 
"Whither the EMU?" June 20, 1997, A1S. 
3 For an extensive overview of the concept see Casimir Dadak, "Political Economy of the Euro Area Cri-
sis," Panoeconomicus, vol. 5S, issue 5 (2011), 593-604, and in Polish Kazimierz Dadak, '''GrecH kryzys' 
- czy przyszlosc Europejskiej Unii Walutowej jest zagrozona," Arcana, no. 97 (2011), 27-37 and "Euro po 
dziesi~ciu latach," Mirdzynarodowy Przeg/ttd Polityczny, no. 23 (200S), 5-1S. 
4 Commission of the European Communities, "One Market, One Money: An Evaluation of the Potential 
Benefits and Costs of Forming an Economic and Monetary Union," European Economy 44 (Brussels: Com-
mission of the European Communities, 1990),45. 
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Numerous experts argue that the decision to create the euro was political rather than 
economic in nature5• The present crisis provides strong evidence that the critics were 
right; the economic disadvantages of the single currency outweigh the benefits. 
Mainstream View of the Crisis 
Yet, the mainstream position held by euro enthusiasts is that the principal reasons 
for the economic collapse in Europe are generous spending on welfare programs and, 
resulting from this, excessive budget deficits and national debt levels. As a result, the 
key element of all programs implemmted to aid failing euro area nations was. extreme 
austerity. The donors, the biggest economies in the euro area and the IMF demand that 
the receiving nations drastically cut spending and increase taxes to meet stringent deficit 
and debt levels. But actual economic data point to a much more complex situation. 
Indeed Tables 1 and 2 show that prior to the eruption of the present crisis Greece 
had been persistently violating the deficit and debt levels prescribed in the 1997 Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact. But this is where the case against budget deficits and debt levels 
exceeding, respectively, 3 and 60 percent of the GDp, ends. During the years 2001-07, 
that is after the introduction of the common currency at the retail level and before the 
start of the present economic disturbance, Germany violated the budget deficit rule five 
times, euro area as a whole once, and Spain none6• Yet, it is Spain and not Germany that 
requested financial aid from the rest of the euro area. Similarly, Ireland, another nation 
that was forced to appeal for financial assistance, enjoyed stellar public finances prior 
to the start of the crisis. With the exception of 2002 when the country recorded a tiny 
budget shortfall (0.4 percent of GDP), Ireland had budget surpluses that were at times 
massive throughout the period? For instance, in 2006 the nation had a surplus equal to 
2.9 percent of GDP. Cyprus, the recipient of the most recent bailout, suffered from sig-
nificant budget deficits in the years 2002-04, but by 2007 it turned the situation around 
and recorded a huge surplus (3.5 percent of GDP). As a result, at the end of 2007 the 
level of national debt in Ireland, Spain, and Cyprus, equaled, respectively, 24.8, 36.3, 
and 58.8 percent of GDP. 
Table 2 also dispels the myth that excessive government expenditure was the culprit. 
Spain's government was spending much less, as a percentage of GDp, than the euro 
area's average and Germany throughout the pre-crisis period. The same is true of Greece 
until 2006. In fact, before 2007 the Greek government was spending a smaller share of 
GDP than an average nation in the euro area or Germany. The problem in Greece was 
5 For instance: Vaclav Klaus, "The Future of the Euro: An Outsider's View", Cato Journal, vol. 24, no. 1-2, 
2004, 171-7 and Dadak, "Political Economy". 
6 Spain, a country in many respects similar to Poland serves as a counterfactual in this paper. 
7 Eurostat, European Commission. 
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not excessive spending, but insufficient taxation. The nation's government was collect-
ingc a smaller share of GDP than those accumulated in frugal Spain. In sum, the argu-
ment that excessive government expenditure, budget deficits, and debt levels are the root 
causes of the present crisis in the euro area has at best weak foundations. 
Table 1 
Government budget position and national debt (% of GDP) 
Indicator Area 2001 12002120031200412005 120061200712008 1200912010 12011 
EA -l.5 -2.6 -3.2 -2.9 -2.5 -l.5 
.. I':i I--
<ll 0 D -3.1 -3.8 -4.2 -3.8 -3.3 -1.7 bJ).-
--cI .t: I--
::I '" E -0.5 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1 l.3 2.4 r:Q 0 0.. 
'---
GR -4.4 -4.8 -5.7 -7.4 -5.6 -6.0 
EA 6l.0 60.4 6l.9 62.3 62.9 6l.6 
-;;; i---
I':i .. D 59.1 60.7 64.4 66.3 68.6 68.1 O...D I--
.- <ll ~"d E 55.6 52.6 48.8 46.3 43.2 39.7 
i---
GR 103.7 101.7 97.4 98.6 100.0 106.1 
EA = Euro area (16), D = Germa~y, E = Spain, GR = Greece. 
Data: Eurostat. 
Table 2 
-0.9 -2.4 
0.2 -0.1 
l.9 -4.5 
-6.8 -9.9 
59.0 62.5 
65.2 66.7 
36.3 40.2 
107.4 113.0 
Governme~t expenditure and revenue (% of GDP) 
-6.9 -6.5 -4.5 
-3.2 -4.3 -l.0 
-1l.2 -9.3 -8.5 
-15.6 -10.5 -9.2 
74.8 80.0 82.5 
74.4 83.0 8l.2 
53.9 6l.2 68.5 
129.4 145.0 165.3 
Indicator Area 2001 12002120031200412005120061200712008120091201012011 
~ ~ EA 47.2 47.5 48.0 47.5 47.4 46.7 
<ll ::I I--8 .~ D 47.6 47.9 48.5 47.1 46.9 45.3 I':i"d I---
... I':i ~ <ll E 38.7 38.9 38.4 38.9 38.4 38.4 o 0.. I---o ~ GR 45.3 45.1 44.7 45.5 44.6 45.2 
.. EA 45.2 44.8 44.8 44.5 44.8", 45.3 I':i I---<ll <ll 8 ::I D 44.5 44.1 44.3 43.3 43.6 43.7 
S I':i I---
<ll ~ E 38.1 38.7 38.0 38.8 .·39.7 40.7 6 >-< I---0 GR 40.9 40.3 39.0 38.1 39.0 39.2 
EA = Euro area (16), D = Germany, E = Spain, GR = Greece. 
Data: Eurostat. 
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47.6 50.6 53.8 50.2 50.1 
45.3 45.0 44.8 44.7 45.3 
43.7 44.0 44.9 43.6 44.7 
41.1 37.0 35.1 36.3 35.1 
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The Introduction of the Buro and Diverging Macroeconomic Paths 
Table 3 
Annual GDP growth (%) and inflation (CPl, %) 
Indicator Area 2001120021200312004120051200612007120081200912010 120111 Ave. 
{j EA 2.0 0.9 0.7 2.2 1.7 3.2 3.0 
~ - D 1.5 0.0 -0.4 1.2 0.7 3.7 3.3 
bJl -
p.. E 3.7 2.7 3.1 3.3 3.6 4.1 3.5 Q 
-0 GR 4.2 3.4 5.9 4.4.,,_ 2.3 5.5 3.5 
EA 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
t:: -
0 D 1.4 1.9 1.4 1.0 1.8 1.9 1.8 
'.0 
til I---q:: E 3.5 2.8 3.6 3.1 3.1 3.4 3.6 t:: 
>-< '---
GR 2.9 3.7 3.9 3.4 3.0 3.5 3.3 
EA = Euro area (16), D = Germany, E = Spain, GR = Greece. 
Data: Eurostat. 
Table 4 
0.4 -4.4 2.0 
1.1 -5.1 4.2 
0.9 -3.7 -0.3 
-0.2 -3.1 -4.9 
2.1 3.3 0.3 
2.3 2.8 0.2 
2.8 4.1 -0.2 
3.0 4.2 1.3 
National gross saving and gross capital formatioh (% of GDP) 
1.4 1.2 
3.0 1.2 
0.4 1.9 
-7.1 1.2 
1.6 2.1 
1.2 1.7 
2.0 2.8 
4.7 3.4 
Indicator Area 2001120021200312004120051200612007120081200912010 120111 Ave. 
bJl EA 20.1 19.7 19.5 20.2 19.9 20.7 21.5 
t:: I---.~ D 20.2 20.1 19.7 22.3 22.4 24.6 26.8 
U) I---
U) 
U) E 22.0 22.9 23.4 22.4 22.1 21.9 21.0 0 
.. 
-0 GR 11.8 9.6 12.2 12.0 10.6 11.2 8.8 
'" 
EA 20.6 19.7 19.7 20.0 20.3 21.2 22.1 
t:: -
OJ D 20.3 18.1 17.9 17.6 17.3 18.1 19.3 S 
'" 
-
U) 
E 26.4 26.6 27.4 28.3 29.5 30.9 31.0 OJ E -
>-< GR 23.2 22.3 24.5 22.5 21.4 24.2 25.7 
EA = Euro area (16), D = Germany, E = Spain, GR = Greece. 
Data: Eurostat. 
20.6 17.9 18.2 19.0 19.8 
25.6 22.3 23.1 23.7 22.8 
19.5 19.3 18.8 18.2 21.0 
5.8 4.0 3.9 3.2 8.5 
21.7 18.4 18.8 19.2 20.2 
19.4 16.5 17.3 18.2 18.2 
29.1 24.4 23.3 22.1 27.2 
23.7 18.3 16.2 14.5 21.5 
Tables 3 and 4 shed some light on actual origins of the euro area troubles. In the pe-
riod 2001-07 both Greece and Spain experienced an above euro area rate of investment 
(gross capital formation) and GDP growth. In fact, Spain was frequently mentioned as 
a success story of the European monetary union. To a significant extent this was a result 
of rapid interest rate decline and foreign capital inflows that financed the investment 
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spurt8• This was especially true in Greece where the difference between the level of sav-
ing and investment was exceptionally high. In both nations the saving rate had been 
declining while at the same time the investment rate had been increasing. In sum, an 
ever growing proportion of gross capital formation was financed with capital inflows9• 
When the crisis exploded, capital flows reversed and both the private and public sectors 
found it exceedingly, difficult to raise moneylO. Hence the need to ask for financial aid 
from other euro area nations. Data in Table 3 also indicate that over the same period 
Germany, a slow-growth nation, enjoyed an excess of saving over investment; hence, it 
was not exposed to the adverse effects of capital flows during the crisis. 
Table 3 also provides evidence on substantial inflationary differentials among euro 
area member-states over the years 2001-0711 • Greece and Spain experienced a much 
higher growth rates and, consequently felt an above average inflationary pressure. None 
of them could have taken a preventive measure, for instance by adopting a restrictive 
monetary policy, because they gave up their own currency and control over the interest 
rate. The rate is now set in Frankfurt by the European Central Bank (ECB) and, as long 
as Germany, the biggest economy in the region, was experiencing sluggish growth the 
bank maintained monetary policy that from the point of view of high-growth nations 
was too lax. As observed above, Spain conducted a very restrictive fiscal stance, but even 
this policy was insufficient to counterbalance the impact of ECB's relatively loose mon-
etary policy and foreign capital inflows. 
The nefarious impact of international capital flows within the euro area is also present 
in international trade data. Table 5 illustrates the magnitude of current account deficits in 
Greece and Spain. Especially Greece was running huge trade deficits prior to the start of 
the crisis and a trade deficit by definition is balanced by a surplus on the capital account. 
The introduction of the euro resulted in significant integration of financial markets in the 
region and fostered enormous capital flows among member-states. These flows allowed 
both Spain and Greece to maintain robust rate of investment and, resulting from this, 
above average rate of economic growth. But these positive developments also led to un-
pleasant consequences, both nations experienced above average inflation rates and, with 
the exchange rate effectively fixed within the euro area, they lost international competi-
tiveness. As an overwhelming majority of their e;:ports was going to other members of the 
euro area, Greece and Spain suffered trade deficits. Once the crisis struck, both nations 
8 Rafal: Kierzenkowski, "Preparing for euro adoption in Poland", aEeD Economic Department WOrking 
Paper No. 790 (Paris: OEeD, 2010), especially pages 30-l. 
9 At the end of 2009 banks that report to the Bank ofInternational Settlements had total assets of $240.8 
and $1,104.4 billion in, respectively, Greece and Spain (Bank o/International Settlements, "BIS Quarterly 
Review, Statistical Annex", March 2011, http://www.bis.org/publlqtrpdflr_qall03.pdf ). In each case, 
those investments were equivalent to approximately three quarters of GD P. 
10 Bank o/International Settlements, "BIS Quarterly Review, Highlights of the BIS International Statistics", 
September 2012, 14-16, http://www.bis.org/publ/ qtrpdf/ Cqt1209b.pdf. 
II The sharp increases in inflation observed in 2009 in Spain and Greece were a result of huge tax hikes. 
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found themselves in an unenviable position. In the absence of devaluation they have to 
regain competitiveness through deflation. Typically, a price and wage compression is ac-
complished through recession and high unemployment, and Greece and Spain, as well as 
Ireland, Portugal, and Italy are no exceptions from this rule. 
Table 5 
Net exports of goods (% of GDP) and exports extra-EU-27 (% of total) 
Indicator Area 2001-120021200312004120051200612007120081200912010 12011 
l4-; EA 0.4 0.9 0.7 0.4 -0.1 -0.6 0 
~ f---
... '" D 4.7 6.3 6.0 6.9 7.0 6.9 0"0 
0..0 f--- ~, 
5j ~ E -5.6 -5.0 -5.1 -6.3 -7.5 -8.4 
'-' f--<lJ 
Z GR -18.4 -19.2 -18.5 -18.1 -16.3 -17.1 
I EA 32.1 32.0 31.2 31.5 32.2 31.7 
'" ... '-' -5j~ D 36.4 36.6 35.1 35.4 35.7 36.4 
E6 -8,rLI E 25.6 25.2 24.7 25.7 27.6 28.8 
-~ GR 35.9 39.2 35.1 35.8 38.2 36.1 
EA = Euro area (16), D = Germany, E = Spain, GR = Greece. 
Data: Eurostat. 
-0.7 -1.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 
8.2 7.3 5.7 6.4 6.0 
-8.6 -7.8 -4.0 -4.5 -3.7 
-20.0 -20.8 -16.0 -13.8 -13.3 
31.8 32.5 33.3 34.7 35.3 
35.3 36.7 37.6 39.9 40.7 
29.2 30.4 30.2 31.3 33.1 
35.0 34.8 36.6 37.4 49.4 
Fiscal Federalism, American and European Experiences 
Theory of optimum currency areas also provides important hints to other factors 
that contribute to the current situation in the euro area. It stipulates that states choosing 
a common currency have to have well correlated business cycles, highly flexible labor 
markets, and a common fiscal authority. A common fiscal authority, frequendy referred 
to as fiscal federalism, may be necessary to overcome the adverse effects of asymmetric 
economic shocks, ~spedally on the demand-side. Kenen made this crystal clear stating 
that members of a monetary union must be "armed with a wide array of budgetary P9li-
des to deal with the stubborn 'pockets of unemployment' that are certain to arise from 
export fluctuations combined with an imperfect mobility of labor"12. In other words, 
states that assume a common currency and give up their own monetary policy need to 
become a transfer union. 
The euro area has no central government and no institution that is in charge of collect-
ing taxes and making transfers among member-states. The idea of the euro area becoming 
12 Peter B. Kenen, "The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: An Eclectic View," in Monetary Problems 
of the International Economy, eds. Robert A. Mundell and Alexander K. Swoboda (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1969),41-60. 
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a transfer union is anathema to some nations, especially Germany13. Chancellor Angela 
Merkel dismissed even a modest proposal to issue common euro area bonds14• The entire 
EU is ill equipped to serve such a function, too. The EU receives funds from member-
states that are equal to about 1.25 percent of the region's GDP. But the monies are distrib-
uted according to a rigid seven-year framework. Moreover, an overwhelming majority of 
the funds are devoted to two items,· common agricultural policy and cohesion funds. The 
Union, by law, is barred from running budget deficits and, overall, the region has little, if 
any, flexibility to address problems stemming from adverse demand-side shocks. 
On the other hand, the United States has a strong central government that col-
lects a majority of all taxes, on average an equivalent of 19 percent of GDP. The federal 
government transfers a significant part of its revenues to states, for instance in 2006 the 
. U.S. Treasury collected $2,407 billion and of the above total it passed onto states over 
$434 billion15.The federal transfers made almost a quarter of all state revenue in that 
year. Also, the federal. government has no limits on running annual budget deficits and 
the country took full advantage of this possibility during the current crisis. In 2009 and 
2010 the budget deficit of the central government equaled about 10 percent of GDP. 
The federal government used its borrowing capacity to drastically increase aid to states 
and, consequently, by 2010 the share of federal transfers in total state revenue rose to 
over 35 percent16• 
The policy of austerity 
The experience of American fiscal federalism is not imitated in Europe at all. Just 
the opposite, the euro area member-states decided to implement an exactly the opposite 
policy, the policy of extreme austerity. The policy is deeply rooted in neoliberal views of 
the economy, including that any government involvement in economic matters, espe-
cially discretionary fiscal policy, is harmful17. 
This thinking permeates economic policy not just in the euro area, but in an over-
whelming majority of EU members. For instance, in 2012 the EU countries, with the 
13 The Economist, "We Don't Want No Transfer Union;' December 4-10, 2011, 63-4; Wolfgang Schauble, 
""Why Austerity is only Cure for the Eurozone," Financial Times, September 5, 2011, http://www.fi:.com/ 
cmslsI0/97b826e2-d7ab-lleO-a06b-00144feabdcO.html#axzz257cnwVNV 
14 Thorsten Severin and Catherine Bremer, "Merkel buries euro bonds as· summit tension rises," Reuters, 
June 26, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/26/us-eurozone-idUSBRE8500CS20120626. 
15 Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Table 12.1. (2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
omb/budgetfHistoricals. 
16 Cheryl H. Lee, Robert Jesse Willhide, and Nancy 1. Higgins, "State Government Finances Summary: 2010", 
U.S. Census Bureau, Governments Division Briefi, December 2011, http://www2.census.gov/govs/state/ 
1 Ostatesummaryreport. pdf 
17 For instance, John B. Taylor, "The lack of empirical rationale for a revival of discretionary fiscal policy," 
American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, vol. 99, no. 2 (2009): 550-5. 
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exception of the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic, adopted the Treaty on Sta-
bility, Coordination and Governance, commonly known as the Fiscal Pact18. The Pact 
sets new, more stringent budget deficit and national debt levels. Structural annual budg-
et deficit cannot exceed 0.5 percent of GDP19. Additionally, nations that accumulated 
public debt in excess of 60 percent of GDP are required to bring it down to the above 
benchmark at a rate of one twentieth per annum. 
Austerity has been the rallying cry throughout the euro area crisis. The temporary 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) extended loans to Greece, Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain, and Cyprus in exchange for strict conditions20. Those conditions strive to limit 
budget deficits at all costs. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the permanent 
instrument that replaces the EFSF in the middle of 20 13 has identical goals. The ESM 
Treaty stipulates that a euro area memb1r-state can obtain aid that is "subject to strict 
conditionality" [emphasis added] that may "range from a macro-economic adjustment 
programme to continuous respect of pre-established eligibility conditions"21 . 
This approach is in conflict with both academic research and opinions propagated 
by major international organizations. For instance, the IMF estimated that, under cur-
rent conditions fiscal multiplier in the euro area is much higher than it had been thought 
before. Instead of being only 0.5, it actually is as high as 1.722 • Therefore, a sudden fiscal 
consolidation does more harm than good. This position is consistent with an OECD 
recommendation stressing that such policies should be implemented at "a steady, grad-
ual pace consistent with a medium-term plan to restore fiscal stability". 
Many academics agree with the above position. Paul Krugman has been the most 
vocal critic of the use of neoliberal prescriptions in combating the crisis23. But many 
others agree with Krugman. For instance Ball, Leigh, and Loungani show that a one 
percent reduction in government expenditure has a significant negative impact on eco-
nomic growth, employment and equitable distribution of income and; hence, budget 
deficit reduction should coincide with robust economic growth24. DeLong and Sum-
mers advocate that, given the exceptionally low interest rates and unusually low demand 
for credit from the private sector, governments should substantially increase borrowing 
and spending and that this fiscal stimulus will pay for itself as economic growth and 
18 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, 2012, http;// 
european-council.europa.eu/media/639235/stOOtscg26_en12.pdf. 
19 Treaty on Stability, Title III, article 1, paragraph b. 
20 Council of the European Union, Extraordinary Council Meeting, Economic and FinancialAjfoirs, Press Release 
9596/10, 2010, http;/ /www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/114324.pdf 
21 Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, T/ESM 2012/en, article 12, paragraph 1, http;// 
www.esm.europa.eu/pdf/esm_treaty3n.pdf. Article 20, par 1 of the Treaty specifies that pricing of such 
loans should cover costs and "include an appropriate margin". 
22 International Monetaty Fund, "World Economic Outlook", (Washington, D.C.; IMF, 2012), 41---43. 
23 Paul Krugman, End This Depression Now! (New York; W. W. Norton & Company, 2012). 
24 Laurence Ball, Daniel Leigh, and Prakash Loungani, "Painful Medicine", Finance 6- Development, Sep-
tember 2011,20-3. 
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rising employment should lead to a dramatic increase in government revenue and no 
long-term increase in national debt25• 
Table 5 also points to the fact that austerity in the euro area has an adverse indirect 
impact on struggling nations in the region. As EU member-states strive td"limit govern-
ment spending and, therefore, experience at best a sluggish rate of economic growth 
Greece and Spain have to find export markets elsewhere. Over the last couple of years 
Greece managed to drastically redirect its exports, in 2011 almost half of its exports 
went outside the EU, a remarkable increase form only 35 percent in 2008. 
International Competitiveness 
One of the main reasons thanks to which Germany managed to escape the present 
crisis is the nation's international competitiveness. Data in Table 5 clearly show that 
Germany, unlike Greece and Spain, has had significant trade surpluses not only prior to 
the outbreak of the crisis but also throughout this catastrophe. Table 5 also demonstrates 
that Germany exports to regions outside the EU substantially more than the euro area 
average. This is possible because Germany has many firms that operate on a global scale 
and enjoy strong brand-name recognition, not only in the traditional heavy industry 
sectors, for instance car manufacturers, but also in other fields. SAP is a leading inter-
national provider of industrial software, Adidas is a global player in sporting goods, and 
Deutsche Bank and Allianz are among the largest providers of financial services. Table 6 
sheds more light on the sources of Germany's international competitiveness. The coun-
try spends considerably more on research and development activities (R&D) than the 
euro area average and the difference in this category between Germany and Spain and 
Greece is truly shocking. As a result, a relatively large percentage of German exports is in 
the high-tech sector, an area that is less sensitive to business cycle fluctuations. 
Overall, as opposed to Spain and, especially Greece, Germany has not suffered from 
the deleterious effects that the adoption of a common' currency conferred on the euro 
area. It has the largest economy and, therefore, the policies of ECB are more in line with 
its needs than those of smaller member-states. It;.is a highly developed economy with very 
well developed infrastructure and, therefore, Germany does not need to invest heavily in 
this area. It enjoys a deep-rooted culture of thrift and, hence, it is a net saver. Germany 
also has a very strong export sector that is less dependent on economic fortunes in the euro 
area and is able to benefit from expansion in other regions of the world, giant emerging 
markets in Asia in particular. The nation spends a relatively large proportion of GDP on 
R&D and, hence, it is able to maintain a high degree of international competitiveness. 
25 Bradford DeLong and Lawrence H. Summers, "Fiscal policy in a depressed economy", March 20,2012, 
http;/ /www.brookings.edu/ ~ / media/Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/20 12_sprin~b pea_papers/20 12_sprin~ 
BPEA_delongsummers.pdf 
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Table 6 
Innovation, high-tech exports (% of total) and spending on R&D (% of GDP) 
Indicator Area 2001 1 2002 J 2003 1 2004 1200512006 120071 2008 1 2009 12010 
EA 19.2 17.6 17.0 17.0 17.1 16.7 13.7 
-
High-tech D 18.3 17.5 16.9 17.8 17.4 17.1 14.0 
-
exports E 7.8 7.2 7.5 7.3 7.3 6.4 5.1 
-
GR 10.3 12.0 12.6 ll.8 10.6 11.0 7.4 
EA 1.86 1.88. 1.87 1.85 1.84 1.87 1.88 
-
Spending D 2.47 2.5 2.54 2.5 2.51 2.54 2.53 r---
on R&D E 0.92 0.99 1.05 1.06 1.12 1.2 1.27 
r--- <!'O 
GR 0.58 N.a. 0.57 0.55 0.6 0.59 0.6 
EA = Euro area, D = Germany, E = Spain, GR = Greece, N.a. = not available. 
Data: World Bank. Eurostat. 
What Are the Lessons for Poland? 
13.2 14.8 14.9 
13.3 15.3 15.3 
5.3 6.2 6.4 
9.3 10.9 10.2 
1.96 2.06 2.06 
2.69 2.82 2.82 
1.35 1.39 1.39 
N.a. N.a. N.a. 
The present crisis offers invaluable lessons for Poland. The euro deprived the mem-
bers of the European Monetary Union of control over monetary policy and the exchange 
rate. Recent developments in the EU also point to a drive to limit the use of fiscal policy 
in fighting harmful effects of adverse economic shocks. Consequently, nations that do 
not possess highly competitive economies may be exposed to unprecedented economic 
disasters that result in extraordinary declines in the standard of living and unparalleled 
levels of unemployment. Tables 7 and 8 provide important clues to the potential iJ;npact 
on Poland, if it chooses to adopt the common currency and implement new economic 
policies that are being endorsed in the euro area, for instance the Fiscal'Pact. 
Data in the tables point to Poland's serious economic weaknesses. The nation has 
been recording serious budget deficits. Over the period of200 1-11 Poland has had much 
higher budget shortfalls than the euro area average. AB a result, the country has been, 
substantially increasing its national debt burden. It is important to note that the rise in 
indebtedness was not a result of a spurt in investment spending. Although, Poland is lag-
ging behind other East-central European nations, let alone the most advanced Western 
European countries in infrastructure development, this was not the main reason behind 
government borrowint6. Consequently, the government failed to accumulate assets that 
it could sell off to retire the debt or that could boost the rate of economic growth and, 
thus, government revenues. The rate at which Poland augments its productive capacity 
is slow, close to that of well developed, mature economies of the euro area rather than 
26 Kazimierz Dadak, "Twenty Years of Economic Transformation: The Price of Economic Orthodo:xy," 
warsaw East European Review, vol. 2 (2012), 131-45. ' 
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to, for instance, the Asian Tigers27. Moreover, like in the case of Greece and Spain, gross 
capital formation is financed with foreign capital to a considerable extent. Over the years 
2001-11 savings in Poland have been insufficient to fund investment expenditure. 
Table 7 
Poland, macroeconomic performance 
Indicator 2001120021200312004120051200612007120081200912010 12011 1 Ave. 
Budget position 
-5.3 (% ofGDP) 
National debt 37.6 (% ofGDP) 
Gross saving 18.4 (% ofGDP) 
Investment 20.8 (% ofGDP) 
GDPgrowth 
(%) 0 1.2 
Inflation 10.1 (CPI, %) 
N.a. = not applicable. 
Data: Eurostat. 
-5.0 
4i.2 
16.5 
18.6 
1.4 
5.3 
-6.2 -5.4 -4.1 -3.6 -1.9 -3.7 -7.4 -7.9 -5.1 N.a. 
47.1 45.7 47.1 47.7 45.0 47.1 50.9 54.8 56.3 N.a. 
17.0 15.9 18.1 18.0 19.4 19.1 17.3 17.2 17.4 17.7 
18.7 20.1 19.3 21.1 24.4 23.9 20.3 21.0 21.7 20.9 
3.9 5.3 3.6 6.2 6.8 5.1 1.6 3.9 4.5 4.0 
1.9 0.7 3.6 2.2 1.3 2.6 4.2 4.0 2.7 2.9 
Table 8 
Poland, international competitiveness 
Indicator 2001 1200212003 1200412005 120061200712008 12009 1201012011 
Net exports of 
goods -4.0 
(% ofGDP) 
Exports extra 
EU-27 18.8 
(% of total) 
High-tech 
exports 3.2 
(% of total) 
R&D spending 0.62 (% ofGDP) 
N.a. = not available. 
Data: Eurostat. 
-3.7 -2.6 -2.2 
18.8 18.1 19.7 
2.9 3.1 3.3 
0.56 0.54 0.56 
-0.9 -2.0 -4.0 -4.9 -1.0 -1.8 -2.1 
21.4 21.0 21.1 22.2 20.4 20.9 22.2 
3.8 3.7 3.0 4.3 6.1 6.7 N.a. 
'" 
0.57 0.56 0.57 0.6 0.68 0.74 N.a. 
Regrettably, similarities between Poland, Spain, and Greece do not end here. Poland 
has had substantial trade deficits over the period 2001-11. This shows that the economy 
is not internationally competitive and that the Polish currency is overvalued. Moreover, 
27 Dadak, "Twenty Years". 
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the nation's exports are primarily destined to other EU nations. As Greece, Poland pos-, 
sesses no firms that operate globally and are recognized for value and quality. The pro-
portion of exports that are considered high-tech is quite small, too. This should come as 
no surprise because Poland spends very little on R&D. 
The experience of the past five years offers direct proof that having its own currency 
saved Poland from the fate of Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland. Between the summer 
of 2008 and the spring of 2009 the value of its currency, the zloty, drastically declined. 
This devaluation allowed the country to boost exports, close the trade deficit and avoid 
recession28 . The National Bank of Poland analysis finds that "the flexible exchange rate" 
has been the main stabilizing force in Poland after 2007 and that adopting the euro 
"would have removed that protection"29. This finding is in line with earlier research that 
demonstrates that the process of re'al and nominal convergence between Poland and 
the euro area is largely incomplete and that an early adoption of the common currency 
could create substantial difficulties and risks30 • Kierzenkowsld especially warns against 
the danger of the boom-bust cycle that occurred in Spain and Ireland and is also likely 
to emerge in Poland should the country join the euro area not fully prepared. 
Conclusions 
The present crisis validates reservations that many experts voiced before and after 
the implementation of the EMU. The euro exposes the region to adverse asymmetric 
shocks and, therefore, requires remedies, for instance, fiscal federalism, that the euro 
area members are loath to implement. Instead, the region follows a policy of extreme 
austerity that is clearly counterproductive. In such an environmentorily countries that 
have internationally competitive economies can withstand economic crises relatively 
well. Unfortunately, Poland is not in this category. The nation suffers from considerable 
trade deficits and exports few high-tech products. The likelihood of a speedy catch up 
is exceedingly low. Poland's investment rate is low and a signific~t part of gross capital 
formation is financed with foreign capital. This makes the country a net debtor and will 
burden it with sizeable capital transfers in the future. The persistent budget deficits and 
a growing national debt burden do not inspire a great deal ~f optimism about the future. 
Additionally, Poland spends disproportionally small amounts on R&D and, therefore, is 
not likely to break out of the present predicament soon. The key factor that has allowed 
Poland to avoid recession is the ability to maintain a flexible exchange rate. Should Po-
land adopt the euro, this most important defense would be gone forever. 
28 Kazimierz Dadak, "Krach mniemany", Wprost, November 9, 2008, 62-63. 
29 Michal Brzoza-Brzezina, KrzysztofMakarski and Grzegorez Wesolowski, "Would it have paid to be in the 
eurozone?", Narodowy Bank Polski, Working Paper, no. 128 (Warszawa: NBp, 2012), 21. 
30 IGerzenkowski, "Preparing for". 
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